Jack Christianson and :Murl Christianson v. Joanne Debry : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1969 
Jack Christianson and :Murl Christianson v. Joanne Debry : Brief 
of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.James P. Cowley; Attorney for Defendnat & Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Christianson v. Debry, No. 11685 (1969). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4827 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK CHRISTIANSON and 
MURL CHRISTIANSON, 




Defendant au BeaporwlMI. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a ludpaeat ol tile '!'bid Dlltdl& 0-' 
Salt Lake Coaat1, State fll 1Jtala 
The Honorable Aldon J. Ami-. , .... 
PUGSLEY, HA YES, WATXISS, CAMPBELL • c:xnrLWf 
JAMES P. COWLEY · 
400 El Paso Gas Buildiq 
salt Lake City, Utah 86111 
Aftomey fo:i: Defendant &C Respondent 
JACKSON B. HOWARD F I L. E D HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
J20 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellantl SEP 9 - 1969 
--CW:. s....- ..... Uillt 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF TlIE CASE---------------------------------- I 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO"\VER COURT____ 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ____________________ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS---------------------------------- 3 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
PERMITTING QUESTIONS AND AN-
SWERS OF DR. ALLRED OI3JECTED TO 
BY THE APPELLANT. -------------------------------------- 6 
POINT II. TIIE APPELLANT "\VAS NOT 
PREJUDICED IN ANY \VAY BY THE 
QUESTIONS AND ANS"\VERS OF DR. ALL-
RED TO WHICH THE APPELLANT HAS 
OBJECTED. -------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------- I I 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
3I Am. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, 
Sections 44, I03, I I3 -------------------------------------------- 7 
CASES CITED 
In Re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d I06, 297 P 2d 
542 (Utah I956) ------------------------------------------------ 8 
Moore v. D. & R. G., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P 2d 849 
Utah ( I956) _:______________________________________________________ 8 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK CHRISTIANSON and 
MURL CHRISTIANSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JOANNE DRBRY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11685 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, Jack Christianson, brought this 
action for property damage, and the plaintiff, Murl 
Christianson, brought the action for personal injuries 
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the 
defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, upon motion of the plaintiffs, 
entered judgment in favor of Jack Christianson for 
property damage in the amount of $77.62 plus his 
costs, and in favor of the plaintiff, lVIurl Christianson, 
on the issue of liability, reserving for trial only the 
issue of damages to the plaintiff, Murl Christianson 
(R-27). The issue of damages with reference to the 
plaintiff, Murl Christianson, was tried to a jury. Con-
trary to the statement in Appellant's brief, the District 
Court entered judgment on the jury verdict which 
awarded plaintiff, Murl Christianson, $1,500 for gen-
eral damages and $1,054.59 special damages (R-71). 
Thereafter the plaintiff, Murl Christianson, moved 
the trial court for a new trial upon the same grounds 
and for the same reasons as submitted to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in the brief of Appellant 
(R-75). Memorandums were submitted to the court 
by both the Appellant and the Respondent and the 
District Court entered its order denying the plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial (R-80 through R-87 inclusive). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff, Murl Christianson, has taken this 
appeal and has requested the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah to grant a new trial on the issue of 
damages. The Respondent opposes thf relief sought 
by the Appellant. 
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STATElVlENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent admits the facts stated by the 
Appellant but believes the facts are insufficient to 
provide this Honorable Court with a proper perspec-
tive. The Respondent recites other additional facts 
which Respondent believes to be pertinent: 
Appellant was a passenger in an automobile which 
was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by 
the Ilespondent on the 23rd day of September, 1965 
(R-103, 104, 105). Immediatley following the accident 
the Appellant continued with her planned evening's 
activities by going to the show at the Valley :Music Hall 
(R-123). The damage to the vehicle was modest; the 
repairs having cost $77.62 (R-2, R-22). 
Within a few days after the accident the Appellant 
saw Dr. Groneman on one professional visit for which 
she was charged $5.00 (R-21). Except for his initial 
examination and his prescription for therapy she was 
not treated further by Dr. Groneman (R-125). Dr. 
Groneman was not called as a witness. 
The Appellant was first seen by Dr. Chapman 
on April 19, 1967, some eighteen months after she had 
seen Dr. Groneman (R-136}. 
"Thile she was being seen and treated by Dr. Chap-
man she continued to drive from her home in Utah 
County to Price, Utah, to assist her ill mother and 
father in the operation of a motel (R-125, 126). 
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The Appellant was seen and examined bv Dr. S. 
"\Villiam Allred on October 22, 1968 (R-188°). 
Dr. Chapman hospitalized )!rs. Christianson and 
performed a myelogram on January 2, 1969 (R-148). 
X-rays were taken by Dr. Groneman in September 
of 1965 (R-160, 162, Ex. D-7, D-12). X-ravs were 
taken by Dr. Chapman in April of 1967 (R-136, 150, 
151, 152, Ex. P--1, P-5, P-6). X-ravs were taken bv . . 
Dr. Allred in October of 1968 (R-188, 191, Ex. D-14, 
D-15, D-16, D-17). X-rays were taken and a myelo-
gram performed by Dr. Chapman in January of 1969 
(R-148). 
Dr. Chapman was called as a plaintiff's witness 
(R-133). Dr. Chapman had not examined the 196j 
X-ray taken by Dr. Groneman until the time of trial 
R-160). During the trial Dr. Chapman examined the 
Groneman X-ray tR-162, Ex. D-12) that was taken 
wit run a few days after the accident and acknowledged 
that this X-ray showed a narrowing disk space that 
predated the accident l R-163). Dr. Chapman further 
acknowledged that ··it is possible for a disk to degene-
rate and cause the type of symptoms suffered by )!rs. 
Christianson without a traumatic injury .. \ R-160, 1611. 
Dr. Ch:1pman categorically stated that the disk nar-
rowiuO' demonstrable on the Gnineman X-ray was not . 
caused by the :1ccident and was nC1t related to the 
nutonwbile accident 1R-llH. hi:?. 103 ·. Dr. Chapman 
further testitied that there was not any appreciable 
differences in the X-r:1ys taken bY Dr. Grlinernan in 
September of 1965, and the X-rays taken by him in 
April of 1967 (R-165). Dr. Chapman testified that the 
myelogram taken in January of 1969 disclosed a disk 
protrusion (R-149). 
Dr. Allred was called as a witness for the defend-
ant concerning his examination of the Appellant of 
October 22, 1968 (R-187). He testified that his exami-
nation did not reveal any numbness; did not reveal 
any difficulty with her eyes; and that it did reveal au 
actual range of the neck with no associated muscle 
spasm. He could find no specific areas of trigger point 
pain. She had a full range of motion of her upper 
extremities. There was no evidence of atrophy about 
the upper extremities. The reflexes and sensation of 
the upper extremities were normal and the grip of 
her hands was good bilaterally (R-189, 190). He 
further expressed the opinion that there was no specific 
nerve root irritation (R-190). Dr. Allred took X-rays 
which demonstrated the same degenerative disk disease 
that was shown on the Groneman X-ray in 1965. He 
testified that "the lipping of the cervical spine would 
have taken more than four or five years to develop" 
(R-191, 192, Ex. D-14, D-15, D-16, D-17). Dr. All-
red testified that in his opinion the condition of the 
cervical spine was present prior to the accident which 
occurred in September of 1965 (R-194). Dr. Allred 
testified that the myelogram did not show a disk pro-
trusion but that it showed "the lipping" of the cervical 
spine that occurred gradually over a period of time 
(R-195). He further testified that a myelogram taken 
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prior to the accident would have shown the same con-
dition (R-195). 
On cross-examination of Dr. Allred it was his testi-
mony that in his examination of October 22, 1968, he 
could not find any objective cause for the symptoms 
complained of by the Appellant (R. 219). 
The medical testimony in this case is lengthy. The 
direct examination of Dr. Chapman takes 27 pages 
of the record and his cross-examination takes 19 pages 
of the record. The redirect examination of Dr. Chap-
man takes 7 pages of the record. The direct examination 
of Dr. Allred takes 9 pages of the record. His cross-
examination takes 24 pages of the record; his redirect 
examination and recross-examination takes 3 pages 
of the record (R. 133-through R-222 inclusive). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT-
TING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS OF DR. 
ALLRED OBJECTED TO BY THE APPEL-
LANT. 
In redirect examination of Dr. Allred counsel for 
the defendant asked a series of questions. The same 
was objected to by plaintiff's counsel because the ques-
tions were based upon the word "could." It is sub-
mitted that under the circumstances the word "could" 
was perfectly proper. Plaintiff's counsel had every 
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opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Allred and following 
the redirect by the defense, plaintiff again had the op-
portunity to further examine Dr. Allred. 
The material found in 31 Am. J ur. 2d under Expert 
and Opinion Evidence states the rule. Section 44 on 
page 548 states: 
"Expert opinion testimony may be given in 
terms of an opinion that something might, could, 
or would produce a certain result. Opinion tes-
timony of this nature is said to be admitted into 
evidence on the theory that an expert witness' 
view as to probabilities is often helpful in the 
determination .of questions involving matters 
of science or technical or skilled knowledge." 
See Section 103: 
" . . . A very liberal practice of permitting 
opinion teistimony of experts in the field of 
medical practice is indulged. A duly qualified 
physician may . . . state his opinion as to the 
nature of the disease, injury, or disability, from 
which a person is or was suffering, and as to the 
facts or causes which probably, or might have, 
produced such condition . " 
See Section 113: 
"As a general rule, expert medical op1mon 
evidence has been admitted where the witness 
expressed it in language which sufficiently de-
scribed the opinion as representing his own best 
judgment regarding particular facts or hypothe-
ses supported by the evidence, and indicated 
with reasonable certainty that causation existed 
or could be found, the testimony not constituting 
a pure, unsupported conclusion; and, as satisfy-
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ing this requirement, courts have approved sub-
stantiated statements of probability, possibility, 
and likelihood, and statements to the effect that 
a cause might lead or could have lead to a result 
proved. Such witnesses have been permitted to 
state what in their opinion was the "possible," 
"probable," or "likely," etc., cause of, or what 
"might" or "could" have caused, death or a par-
ticula,r physical condition." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Moore 
v. D. & R.G., cited in 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P 2d 849 
( 1956) reversed the trial court because in the view of 
the Supreme Court there was insufficient evidence to 
create a jury issue because the only medical testimony 
related to a "possibility." The Supreme Court found 
that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden with such a 
limited amount of evidence. However, the Court in that 
case used the following language: 
"This court has ]ong recognized that the mere 
use of words such as "belief," "impression," 
"probability," or "possibility" will not exclude a 
witness' testimony where his expression does not 
indicate a lack of personal observation, but mere1y 
the degree of positiveness of his original obser-
vation of the facts or the degree of positiveness 
of his recollection." 
In a subsequent case In Re Richard's Estate cited 
in 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P 2d 542 (1956) the Supreme 
Court of Utah referred to the Moore v. D. & R. G. 
case on page 547 as follows: 
"Counsel further suggests that the answers 
of this expert were so uncertain and vague that 
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they sh?uld not have been submitted to the jury 
... This was an erroneous interpretation of that 
holding. That case recognized that the mere use 
of such words as "belief," "impression," "proba-
bility," or "possibility" did not render testimony 
inadmissible, but held that in the particular con-
text the qualifying phrases rendered the testi-
mony too insubstantial when standing alone to 
support the verdict." 
It is submitted that there was no impropriety in 
permitting Dr. Allred to answer the questions contain-
ing the word "could." 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJU-
DICED IN ANY WAY BY THE QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS OF DR. ALLRED TO 
WHICH THE APPELLANT HAS OBJECTED. 
Considering the lengthy medical testimony by the 
two physicians who were called as witnesses and con-
sidering their agreement in some regards and their 
disagreement in others, it cannot be said that the jury 
was not fully and completely apprised of the contentions 
of the parties. The jury had a full and fair opportunity 
to hear, see and understand the testimony of both physi-
cians and to hear them express those certain opinions 
wherein they agreed and those certain opinions wherein 
they disagreed. 
By reviewing a few of the pertinent and essential 
facts the verdict of the jury is understandable; is com-
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pletely supported by such facts and cannot be said to 
be the result of any passion or prejudice. For the pur-
pose of justifying the jury's verdict, I call to the atten-
tion of the court some of the specific facts over which 
there was no controversy and which stand in the record 
uncontroverted: 
1. Following the accident the plaintiff saw her 
family physician on one professional visit and was not 
thereafter seen or treated by him on a professional basis. 
2. Some eighteen ( 18) months after the accident 
the Appellant went to see Dr. Chapman for the first 
time. 
3. Dr. Chapman admitted that she had a pre-
existing cervical condition and his testimony was to the 
effect that it had been in the making for at least ten 
years prior to the date of the accident. His opinion 
was corroborated by the opinion of Dr. Allred. 
4. The nature of the impact between the cars was 
modest as was evidenced by the photograph introduced 
into evidence showing the condition of plaintiff's car 
following the accident, and further substantiated by 
the fact that the repair bill was less than $80. 
5. The modest nature of the impact was further 
demonstrated by the fact that the Appellant and other 
parties in the vehicle went on to Valley Music Hall, 
stayed and watched the show and then drove back home 
that evening. 
'Vhile Dr. Allred's testimony was in conflict with 
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that of Dr. Chapman, it should be noted that it was the 
opinion of Dr. Allred that had a myeloma been taken 
befort. the accident that it would have shown the same 
results as the myelogram taken some two months before 
the trial, and he explained this by indicating on the 
X-ray taken the day after the accident the spurring on 
the bony structure that caused the displacement in the 
spinal column of the radioactive material used in the 
myelogram. 
The jury awarded to the Appellant all of the 
medicals and specials claimed by Appellant and in 
addition thereto awarded to her $1,500 general dam-
ages. It is obvious that the jury believed, and such 
belief is substantiated by the evidence, that Appellant 
had a preexisting condition and that the Respondent 
was in no way responsible for all of the physical diff i-
culties and problems of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court and the jury should 
be affirmed and the appeal of the Appellant demanding 
a new trial on the issue of damages should be denied 
and dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
400 El Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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